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NOTES
Narcotics Offenders and the Internal
Revenue Code: Sheathing the Section
6851 Sword
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE RAMBO CASE

On April 6, 1972, Charles Rambo was arrested in Louisville,
Kentucky and charged with reckless driving. A search of his car and
person uncovered a supply of drugs and 2,200 dollars in cash. On
April 24, 1972, the District Director of Internal Revenue for the
District of Kentucky informed Mr. Rambo that pursuant to section
6851 of the Internal Revenue Code, his taxable year for the period
January 1, 1972-April 24, 1972, was terminated and an income tax
of $24,446.88 was immediately due and payable. After making an
assessment on April 25, 1972 and filing a notice of federal tax lien,
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) served notices of levy on Mr.
Rambo and his bank. The bank turned over to the IRS $12,661.25,
and a public sale of three automobiles that had been taken from Mr.
Rambo was scheduled for September 14, 1972. On August 14, 1972,
Mr. Rambo filed suit in the United States District Court seeking
preliminary and permanent injunctions to prohibit the sale and to
require that the seized property be returned. The district court
granted the relief requested,' but the order was stayed pending an
appeal by the government. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that
Mr. Rambo had been denied the procedural safeguards of the Internal Revenue Code because he had not been issued a deficiency
notice as required by section 6861 and thus was denied access to the
Tax Court for a redetermination of the tax imposed.'
The facts of the Rambo case are typical of a growing number
of cases being litigated in the federal district and appellate courts
and the Tax Court.' Rambo, however, was the first federal circuit
1. Rambo v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Ky. 1972). The district court
enjoined the public sale of the automobiles, and the government filed an interlocutory appeal
to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Before the appeal could be heard, the district court
granted summary judgment for Rambo and ordered the government to return all property
and to refrain from further attempts to collect the assessed tax. All encumbrances were
released from Rambo's property.
2. Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1974).
3. See, e.g., Aguilar v. United States, 501 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1974); Clark v. Campbell,
501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974); Willits v. Richardson, 497 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1974); Lewis v.
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court decision to grant an injunction and hold that Tax Court review
is available to a taxpayer whose taxable year has been terminated
pursuant to section 6851. It is particularly significant that equitable
relief was granted because the Internal Revenue Code specifically
prohibits an injunction to prevent the collection of a tax except
under special, enumerated circumstances.'
The summary collection procedures used by the IRS in Rambo
in effect have become another arm of the criminal justice system for
they have been applied with increasing frequency to suspected criminal offenders, particularly narcotics dealers. An Internal Revenue
Service Manual Supplement dated November 10, 1971, entitled
"IRS Narcotics Project-Intelligence Division Procedures," stated
that the purpose of the Project is to "disrupt the distribution of
narcotics through the enforcement of all available tax statutes
.... "5 Thus, the IRS is actively and openly engaged in the war
against illicit drug traffic and the section 6851 procedures are swift,
decisive, and extremely effective weapons.
The procedures followed by the IRS are simple. The IRS is
alerted when a suspected narcotics dealer is arrested. Often revenue
agents are notified earlier and may even be present at the time of
arrest. Subsequent to the arrest, the taxpayer is given a "Termination Notice" in the form of a letter informing him that all taxes for
the terminated period are immediately due and payable and demanding payment of a specified amount.' If the taxpayer refuses or
Sandler, 498 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1974); Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1974);
Hall v. United States, 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1974); Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1974);
Preble v. United States, Civ. No. 73-3072-F (D. Mass. May 23, 1974); Boyd v. United States,
33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1246 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Shaw v. McKeever, 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1027
(D. Ariz. 1974); Williams v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 71 (D. Nev. 1973); Woods v.
McKeever, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5967 (D. Ariz. 1973); Millington v. Conley, Civ. No. 15,729
(D. Conn. June 20, 1973); Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz. 1973); Parrish v.
Daly, 350 F. Supp. 735 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D.
Md. 1969).
4. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7421(a). See note 20 infra.
5. This document was an exhibit in Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz.
1973), appeal docketed, Nos. 73-2037 & 73-2038, 9th Cir. June 8, 1973. Silver, Terminating
the Taxpayer's Taxable Year: How IRS Uses It Against Narcotics Suspects, 40 J. Tiox. 110 &
n.1 (1974).
6. This letter reads as follows:
NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF TAXABLE PERIOD
Dear Taxpayer:
Pursuant to section 6851 of the Internal Revenue Code, you are notified that I have found
you have acted in a manner indicating that you may conceal assets thereby tending to
prejudice or render ineffectual collection of income tax for the period -.
terminated; and,
through Accordingly, I have declared the taxable period of consequently, the income tax for the terminated period has become immediately due
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is unable to pay, an assessment is made,' a tax lien is filed, and the
assets of the taxpayer are seized.' These steps may occur virtually
simultaneously and within a matter of hours of the arrest. The
reported cases indicate that the IRS has often seized suspects' assets
even though it has little evidence of either tax evasion or drug dealing.' Moreover, the amounts assessed often appear totally arbitrary,'" and the possibility that the suspect subsequently may be
cleared of the criminal charges" apparently is an irrelevant considand payable. Demand is hereby made for the tax for the terminated period in the
following amount.
Taxable Period
Tax
Penalty

Any portion of the tax for the terminated period which is unpaid shall be assessed
against you, and administrative or judicial action to collect the assessment shall be
taken immediately.
Silver, supra note 5, at 112.
7, Sometimes this is done following the preparation of a return by the IRS for the
taxpayer pursuant to § 6020(b). Section 6020(b) allows the IRS to make a return for a
taxpayer whenever a return is "required" and the taxpayer fails to do so. Whether a return
is required following termination is not clear. Section 443(a)(3) states that a return "shall"
be filed following termination, but the regulations do not outline any procedures for this. In
practice, the IRS will not terminate the tax year, then wait for the taxpayer to file under §
443(a)(3). Termination, assessment, levy, and seizure all occur within a short time-frame. See
Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 117-18 n.28 (5th Cir. 1974); Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F.
Supp. 398, 403 n.9 (D. Ariz. 1973); O'Dell, Assessments: What Are They-Ordinary?Immediate? Jeopardy?, N.Y.U. 31sT INST. ON FED. TAx. 1495, 1520, 1522 n.86 (1973); Meyers,
Termination of Taxable Year: Proceduresin Jeopardy, 26 TAX L. REv. 829, 835-38 (1971). The
relationship of §§ 443(a)(3), 6020(b), 6012 (dealing with persons required to make returns of
income) and 6851 is extremely complex and has not been addressed in the cases to any great
extent. Textwriters have been quite vocal in contending that the question of the necessity of
a return is extremely significant.
8. See generally Meyers, supra note 7, at 829, 831-33; Comment, Code Section
6851-Terminationof Taxable Year-Applicationand Function Within the InternalRevenue
Code of 1954, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 381, 381-82 (1973).
9. See, e.g., Aguilar v. United States, 501 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1974); Willits v. Richardson, 497 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1974).
10. The taxpayer in a termination case is not given a copy of the Revenue Agent's
Report setting forth the method by which the IRS arrives at its assessment. Making this
report available is standard procedure in nonjeopardy cases. Silver, supra note 5, at 110. In
Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz. 1973), the assessment of over $100,000 was
reached by taking a 2 month period of alleged marijuana sales as an average for the entire
terminated period. No tangible evidence of the actual level of dealing was produced at the
trial. In Willits v. Richardson, 497 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1974), the assessment of $25,549 was
based upon alleged sales of 6 kilos of cocaine. No proof of these sales was presented at the
injunction hearing. In Aguilar v. United States, 501 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1974), a Mexican
citizen's truck and $11,000 cash were seized. No drugs were found and charges were never
brought against him for drug-related activity. An assessment for over $11,000 was made
against the taxpayer, however. See Williams v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 71 (D. Nev.1973)
(assessment based on multiple hearsay that taxpayer had been selling $900 worth of narcotics
per day).
11. See note 10 supra. Charles Rambo was never prosecuted for any charge related to
his arrest on April 6, 1972.
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eration. In the two and one half year period ending December 31,
1973, the Narcotics Project, which operates in about 90 cities, resulted in the seizure of approximately 27,000,000 dollars and assessments of an additional 101,000,000 dollars against 3475 suspects.
Fewer than one hundred of these taxpayers have been convicted of
tax fraud, and tax.evasion charges* actually have been brought
against only a small percentage of the suspects.12 In short, the section 6851 procedures are a summary means of enforcing the narcotics laws by depriving a suspected dealer of most, if not all, of his
assets and then making recovery extremely burdensome and time
consuming. 1
This Note first will analyze the Internal Revenue Code provisions supporting the current crackdown by the IRS on suspected
narcotics dealers. Secondly, it will examine the split in the federal
circuit courts of appeal on the issues of the availability of Tax Court
review of an assessment made pursuant to a section 6851 termination of a taxable year and the availability of equitable or statutory
protections to prevent the seizure and sale of property belonging to
the taxpayer. Lastly, a discussion of the propriety of such conduct
by the IRS and its constitutionality in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions concerning due process of law and prejudgment seizure of
property will be followed by specific criticisms of the activity and
suggestions for congressional or Supreme Court intervention.' 4
II.

THE STATUTORY BACKGROUND

A.

1954 Code Provisions

Charles Rambo's tax was found to be "in jeopardy" within the
meaning of section 6851 of the Code which follows in part:
SEC. 6851. TERMINATION OF TAXABLE YEAR
(a) Income Tax in Jeopardy.(1) In general.--If the Secretary or his delegate finds that a taxpayer
designs quickly to depart from the United States or to remove his property
therefrom, or to conceal himself or his property therein, or to do any other act
tending to prejudice or to render wholly or partly ineffectual proceedings to
collect the income tax for the current or the preceding taxable year unless such
proceedings be brought without delay, the Secretary or his delegate shall declare the taxable period for such taxpayer immediately terminated, and shall
12. Wall Street J., Apr. 10, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
13. Several years may elapse between the seizure of the taxpayer's property and any
judicial relief that may be afforded.
14. On October 15, 1974, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the government in
Hall v. United States, 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1974) (following Rambo), and to the taxpayer
in Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1974). In the petition for certioari in Hall, it
was stated that 600 § 6851 terminations occurred in fiscal year 1972, and over 1800 in fiscal
1973. 9 CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 8056.
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cause notice of such finding and declaration to be given the taxpayer, together
with a demand for immediate payment of the tax for the taxable period so
declared terminated and of the tax for the preceding taxable year or so much
of such tax as is unpaid, whether or not the time otherwise allowed by law for
filing return and paying the tax has expired; and such taxes shall thereupon
become immediately due and payable. In any proceeding in court brought to
enforce payment of taxes made due and payable by virtue of the provisions of
this section, the finding of the Secretary or his delegate, made as herein provided, whether made after notice to the taxpayer or not, shall be for all purposes presumptive evidence of jeopardy. 5

Persons in the position of Rambo are told by form letter in general
terms that they have acted in a manner indicating that they may
conceal assets and thereby prejudice or render ineffectual the collection of income taxes. The termination letter does not contain the
specific facts that led the district director to that conclusion."6
Section 6851 does not contain any independent assessment au-8
thority,' 7 and before a tax may be collected it must be assessed.
The contention of the government in Rambo and other recent cases
has been that the assessment following a section 6851 termination
is made pursuant to section 6201, which in general terms authorizes
the IRS to make assessments of taxes. 9 After making an assessment, the IRS has extensive power under sections 6331-36 to levy
on the taxpayer's property and hold a public sale to satisfy the
assessment. Moreover, section 7421 of the Code further protects the
government's interests by severely restricting the taxpayer's right to
an injunction to restrain the assessment and collection of the tax.2"
The section follows in part:
SEC. 7421. PROHIBITION OF SUITS TO RESTRAIN ASSESSMENT OR
COLLECTION.
(a) Tax.-Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), and
7426(a) and (b)(1), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether
or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.

In a normal, nonjeopardy case, after a taxpayer has filed a
return at the close of a taxable year, the IRS will determine that a
INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 6851(a)(1).
16. See note 6 supra.
17. In Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969), the government
contended that § 6851 impliedly contained its own assessment authority. See text accompanying note 59 infra.
18. "An assessment is an administrative determination that a certain amount is currently due and owing as a tax. It makes the taxpayer a debtor in much the same way as would
a judgment." Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1061 n.1 (6th Cir. 1974).
15.

19.

INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 6201(a) reads in part as follows:

The Secretary or his delegate is authorized and required to make the inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes ...

20. Id. § 7421(a).

imposed by this title ....
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"deficiency" exists if it has reason to suspect that he has failed to
pay all or a portion of the taxes due. 2' In order to recover this deficiency, the IRS must send a formal notice of deficiency by certified
or registered mail. 22 The taxpayer then has a choice of forums in
which to contest the validity of the deficiency. The taxpayer may
file a petition for a redetermination of the tax in the Tax Court
within ninety days of his receipt of the deficiency notice, 2 or the
taxpayer may choose to pay the alleged deficiency and file suit for
a refund in the district court. 24 The suit for refund takes longer and
requires prepayment of the deficiency by the taxpayer, but has the
2
attraction of affording the taxpayer the right to a jury trial.
The Tax Court's jurisdiction to redetermine tax liability is conditioned on the prior issuance of a deficiency notice. 2 The significance of the IRS contention that section 6201 is the assessment
authority following a section 6851 termination is that section 6201
itself makes no mention of a deficiency notice or letter. The IRS
contends that an assessment made pursuant to section 6201 is not
an assessment for a "deficiency" and therefore no deficiency notice
is required. The taxpayer thus would be denied access to the Tax
Court. Under the government's view in Rambo and similar section
6851 cases, the only remedy of the taxpayer is to pay the tax, file a
return at the end of the normal taxable year, and then bring an
27
action for a refund in the district court.
Conversely, Mr. Rambo contended that assessment authority
following a jeopardy termination under section 6851 is not contained
in section 6201, but is conferred by section 6861, which specifically
applies to "jeopardy" assessments. 2 A section 6861 jeopardy assess21. Id. § 6211(a). "A deficiency is neither a legal theory nor an intangible concept. It is
an amount of tax due representing the difference between the amount returned by the taxpayer and the amount which, in fact and law, is due the Government." 9 J. MERTENS, LAW
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION [hereinafter cited as MERTENS],
22. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6212(a).

§ 49.129 (1974).

23. Id. § 6213(a).
24. Id. §§ 1346, 7422.
25. "IT]he action for refund of taxes is in the nature of a common law action for money
had and received . . . ." 10 MERTENS § 58A.35, at 113 (1974). 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1970) grants
either party in a refund suit the right to request a jury trial.
26. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6213(a). The formal deficiency notice has been described
as a "ticket to the tax court." Corbett v. Frank, 293 F.2d 501, 502 (9th Cir. 1961).
27. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6511, 6535, 7422.
28. Id. § 6861 provides:
(a) Authority for Making.--If the Secretary or his delegate believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency, as defined in section 6211, will be jeopardized by
delay, he shall, notwithstanding the provisions of section 6213(a), immediately assess
such deficiency . . . and notice and demand shall be made by the Secretary or his
delegate for the payment thereof.
(b) Deficiency Letters.--If the jeopardy assessment is made before any notice in
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ment is designed to cover jeopardy situations that arise after a taxpayer has filed a return at the end of his normal tax year. Section
6861(b) requires a deficiency letter, which is a prerequisite to the
right to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of the assessment and contest the validity of the tax before it is paid. If the IRS
fails to issue the required deficiency notice within sixty days of the
jeopardy assessment, the taxpayer may seek an injunction prohibiting the collection of the tax and invalidating any levy. 9 If a deficiency letter is sent, the taxpayer may delay collection proceedings"
if he posts an adequate bond,3 and even if he is unable to post a
bond, seized property may not be sold at auction except under enumerated, limited circumstances.3" The receipt of a deficiency notice
is obviously of great importance to a taxpayer whose taxable year
has been terminated because the ability to petition the Tax Court
before payment can mean the difference between economic survival
33
and disaster.
The principal question raised in recent section 6851 cases is
whether the IRS must issue a section 6861 deficiency letter subsequent to a section 6851 termination. Section 6851 itself neither mentions the assessment authority following termination nor specifies
whether a deficiency is created when a section 6851 tax is imposed. 34
A literal reading of the Code, without resort to other considerations,
seems to lead to the conclusion that assessment authority is to be
found in section 6201 because it is a general provision designed to
cover most situations. Taxpayers have contended, however, that
Congress could not have intended to treat section 6851 taxpayers
differently than section 6861 taxpayers since both sections involve
jeopardy assessments. The statutory history of the relevant Code
provisions is often cited for support by both sides in section 6851
cases.
respect of the tax to which the jeopardy assessment relates has been mailed under
section 6212(a), then the Secretary or his delegate shall mail a notice under such subsection within 60 days after the making of the assessment.
29. Id. § 6213(a).
30. Id. 44 6331-36.
31. Id. § 6863(a).
32. Id. § 6863(b)(3)(A).
33. Nevertheless, the § 6861 procedures have come under heavy attack in recent years,
with many of the same criticisms being made of § 6861 as have been made of § 6851. See,
e.g., Gould, Jeopardy Assessments-When They May Be Levied and What To Do About
Them, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 937 (1960); Hochman & Tack, Jeopardy Assessments-A System in Jeopardy, 45 TAxEs 418 (1967); Kaminsky, Administrative Law and
Judicial Review of JeopardyAssessments Under the InternalRevenue Code, 14 TAX L. REv.
545 (1959); O'Dell, supra note 7, at 1495; Note, Jeopardy Assessment: The Sovereign's
Stranglehold,55 GEo. L. J. 701 (1967).
34. See notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
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Statutory History

The Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1918 did not provide any prepayment procedure by which a taxpayer could challenge an IRS assessment; the only review provided was in a suit for a refund after
paying the tax. Assessment authority for section 250(g) of the 1918
Act, which was the predecessor of section 6851 and was almost
identical to it, was, as for all taxes imposed, found in section 3176
of the Revised Statutes, a general assessment provision similar to
today's section 6201.
In 1924 Congress established a prepayment review forum, the
Board of Tax Appeals,35 which was given non-exclusive jurisdiction
because sections 274(b) and 279(b) of the 1924 Act gave both the
government and the taxpayer the right to further suit in the district
courts. The government's power of immediate assessment in the
normal, nonjeopardy situation was limited by section 274(a), which
required the IRS to send the taxpayer a deficiency notice informing
him that a deficiency was due and that the IRS intended to assess
and collect it. Following receipt of this notice, however, the taxpayer
had sixty days within which to petition the Board for a redetermination of the deficiency.30 When the IRS made a jeopardy assessment
under section 274(d), 37 no deficiency notice was required and a taxpayer could get to the Board only by posting a bond and bringing a
claim in abatement.38 Thus, prior to 1926, neither section 6851 nor
6861 taxpayers (as they would now be called) had a right to prepayment review before the Board of Tax Appeals, which has since become the Tax Court.
The Revenue Act of 1926 changed the rights of both normal and
jeopardy taxpayers and brought the statutory scheme to its present
form. No recourse was available to a federal district court after suit
was brought before the Board, and direct appeal from the Board to
the circuit courts of appeal was provided. The normal taxpayer
could now seek judicial review of an assessment either by going
before the Board without first paying the tax or by paying the tax
and then suing for a refund. The 1926 Act also extended the defi39
ciency notice requirement to section 6861 jeopardy taxpayers,
which gave them the right to a redetermination by the Board. If the
jeopardy assessment" preceded the notice of deficiency, the IRS was
35.
36.
37.
6861).
38.
39.
40.

In the Revenue Act of 1942 the Board of Tax Appeals became the Tax Court.
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(a),(c), 43 Stat. 296.
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(d), 43 Stat. 296 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 279(a)-(b), 43 Stat. 300.
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 279(b), tit. II, 44 Stat. 9.
Jeopardy assessment authority was expressly granted by § 279(a).
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required to send a deficiency notice within sixty days after the date
of the assessment,4 at which time the taxpayer could petition the
Board for an adjudication." These procedures are now contained in
sections 6861, 6212(a) and 6213(b) of the 1954 Code.4"
Since 1926 the only difference between a section 6861 jeopardy
taxpayer and a normal taxpayer has been that the latter has the
right to petition for and receive a determination by the Tax Court
before the assessment, although the section 6861 taxpayer can be
made to wait up to sixty days after the jeopardy assessment before
being sent the deficiency notice. If the government does not send a
deficiency notice, both normal and jeopardy taxpayers may obtain
injunctive relief under section 6213(a). 44
The IRS, in interpreting the statutory history outlined above,4"
takes the position that assessment authority for section 6851 cannot
be found in section 6861 since section 6851 was enacted prior to
section 6861 and the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals. In 1926,
the IRS argues, when section 6861 took its present form (and section
6851 remained unchanged), the Act specifically gave Board review
to a taxpayer upon whom a jeopardy assessment had been imposed
without giving a corresponding right to a taxpayer whose taxable
year had been terminated. Therefore, the argument goes, Congress
must have intended for the termination taxpayer to have no more
rights than he did prior to the creation of the Board.
Although this argument is technically attractive, it is inconsistent with the basic theory and purpose of the Tax Court. Rambo and
several other recent cases" have examined the intent of Congress in
creating the Board and have found that Congress could not have
designed to treat a section 6851 taxpayer differently than a section
6861 taxpayer. The following quotation from the legislative history
of the 1924 Act offers strong, if not "compelling,"4 evidence of the
validity of this position:
41. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 279(b), tit. I, 44 Stat. 9.
42. Id. § 274(a).
43. A jeopardy taxpayer now has 90 days to petition the Tax Court after receiving a
deficiency letter, which is commonly called a "90-day letter." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §
6213(a).
44. "Thus . . .section 6213 clearly grants the district court jurisdiction to enjoin the
assessments and levies . . .unless such assessment was imposed in accordance with the
authority granted in the jeopardy assessment provisions of section 6861. Section 6861 by
contrast reflects the Congressional recognition that in the limited circumstances where the
collection of revenue seems to be in jeopardy, any hardship resulting from levying on a
taxpayer's assets prior to judicial review is outweighed by the Government's need to protect
revenue which would otherwise be lost." Sherman v. Nash, 488 F.2d 1081, 1084 (3d Cir. 1973).
45. See Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1271 (D. Md. 1969).
46. See, e.g., Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 122 (5th Cir. 1974).
47. Id.
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The right of appeal after payment of the tax is an incomplete remedy, and does
little to remove the hardship occasioned by an incorrect assessment. The payment of a large additional tax on income received several years previous and
which may have, since its receipt, been either wiped out by subsequent losses,
invested in non-liquid assets, or spent, sometimes forces taxpayers into bankruptcy, and often causes great financial hardship and sacrifice. These results
are not remedied by permitting the taxpayer to sue for the recovery of the tax
after this payment. He is entitled to an appeal and to a determination of his
liability for the tax prior to its payment.4 8

Ill.

THE JUDICIAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Littauer Case

In 1938 the Board of Tax Appeals in Ludwig Littauer & Co. v.

Commissioner" first considered whether the procedural safeguards
of section 273 (now section 6861) were applicable to a termination
of taxable year under section 146 (now section 6851). The taxpayer
contended that the termination notice itself constituted a notice of
deficiency supporting a proceeding for redetermination of liability
by the Board. The Board rejected this contention, observing that
section 146 supplements sections 272 (now section 6212) and 273 "to
provide a means of protecting the Government from the loss of tax
through the imminent disappearance of the means of payment."5
The Board recognized that both sections 146 and 273 dealt with
jeopardy situations, but concluded that section 146 contemplated
more critical circumstances than section 27351 and therefore the
deficiency notice procedure of section 273 did not apply to section
146. The section 146 taxpayer was deemed adequately protected by
his ability to post a bond to avoid immediate payment and his right
to file a full-year return and sue for a refund in the district court. 5
Finally, and most significantly, the Board determined that the
"thing" created by a section 146 termination was not a deficiency
as defined in the Code, but was "a provisional statement of the
amount which must be presently paid as against the possibility of
collection."53
48. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
49. 37 B.T.A. 840 (1938).
50. Id. at 841.
51. "In the body of the subdivision the word jeopardy is not used, but the subdivision
is entitled 'TAx IN JEOPARDY.' Both the substance of the subdivision and its title indicate an
intention to supply a remedy in emergency more extreme than that covered by section 273."
Id.
52. 37 B.T.A. at 842-43.
53. Id. at 842. "In Littauer the Board of Tax Appeals viewed this event (termination of
tax year) not as the final imposition of a tax but rather as a type of mandatorily imposed
bond to ensure payment at the end of the normal taxable period." Clark v. Campbell, 501
F.2d 108, 118 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Littauer was followed in Puritan Church of America v.
5 4 and until 1969 the law thus was firmly established
Commissioner,
that a taxpayer whose taxable year was terminated pursuant to
section 6851 was not entitled to a deficiency notice and, hence, was
not entitled to review of the termination assessment in the Tax
Court.

B.

The Schreck Case

In 1969 the Littauer holding that Tax Court review was unavailable was challenged anew in Schreck v. United States.55 Every case
since Schreck has lauded the thoroughness of the opinion by Judge
Kaufman although many have disapproved of his final conclusions
and holding.5 While Schreck was a district court decision, in effect
it has become the leading case with which subsequent cases have
had to contend.
In Schreck-a case factually similar to Rambo-a large sum of
cash and other personal property belonging to Schreck were seized
by federal agents in a nontax-related search on October 23, 1967.
Two weeks later, the IRS sent Schreck a letter advising him that
pursuant to section 6851 the IRS had terminated his taxable year
and that his income tax for the short tax year January 1, 1967October 25, 1967, was immediately due and payable. After assessing
a tax of 20,730 dollars, the IRS filed a notice of tax lien and a notice
of levy against the property seized. Schreck sought an injunction
under section 6213(a), which expressly allows injunctive relief
against the assessment, levy, or collection of a tax when the IRS
does not send the deficiency notice required by section 6861.11 Thus,
to apply section 6213, the court first had to determine that section
6861 was triggered by a section 6851 termination. The issue as stated
by Judge Kaufman was simply "whether a taxpayer has a right to
have adjudicated in the Tax Court the validity of an assessment in
a jeopardy situation made for a short year period.""8
In Schreck, the government contended that section 6851 itself
is the assessing authority following termination of a taxable year,
although the section does not mention any such authorization. The
54. 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 453 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 209 F.2d 306 (1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 975 (1954). There are indications that the Tax Court is no longer comfortable with
its Littauer decision. See Nino Sanzogno, 60 T.C. 321, 330 (1973) (Simpson, J., concurring).
55. 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969).
56. E.g., Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20, 23-24 (1973).
57. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6213(a) provides an exception to the general antiinjunction provision of § 7421. See notes 20 & 44 supra and accompanying text.
58. 301 F. Supp. at 1268.
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government further argued, as it later did in Rambo,that no deficiency notice was required since the assessment was not made pursuant to section 6861. Following an exhaustive analysis of the statutory and case history of the relevant Code provisions, Judge Kaufman, holding in favor of the taxpayer, refuted the government's
arguments. In reaching the conclusion that the authority for a jeopardy assessment for a short-year period is section 6861, Judge Kaufman admitted that "the words of the statutes do not irresistably
lead to either of the conflicting constructions urged in this case,"' 9
but he opined that the very purpose of the Tax Court was to provide
a prepayment forum to protect the taxpayer from great financial
hardship and sacrifice caused by requiring him to pay an incorrectly
assessed tax. Moreover, he reasoned that the more "natural" reading of the legislation and its chronology supported the plaintiff's
theory:
Congress seemed to be saying to the IRS:
Before the 1926 Act, you could use the predecessor of section 6851 to terminate
the taxable year and accelerate the due date of payment, but to assess you had
to use the general authorizing statute. Now, in the 1926 Act, you may still use
the predecessor of section 6851 for the same purposes as before, but to assess
you must utilize the statute authorizing jeopardy assessments, i.e., the predecessor of section 6861.0

On the second major question of statutory interpretation,
whether the "thing" created by a section 6851 termination was a
deficiency, Judge Kaufman found that although a "contrary reading
[of the government's position] is not compelled,""1 reading the
Code in the light of all factors, "including administrative action,
legal developments in Congress and the courts, and opposing considerations of policy,"6 2 led to the conclusion that a deficiency was
created and Tax Court review was available.
Thus, since the section 6851 termination assessment had created a deficiency and since the deficiency letter required by section
6861, which is the assessment authority for such a termination, had
not been sent, an injunction under section 6213 was warranted. This
rationale, with only slight variation, was later adopted by the Sixth
3
Circuit in Rambo.6
59. Id. at 1284.
60. Id. at 1273.
61. Id. at 1275. "According to the Government, a section 6861 assessment is appropriate
where there is a predetermined and preexisting income tax deficiency, and subsequent activity of the taxpayer threatens to prejudice its collection; whereas, on the other hand, a section
6851 assessment is available when there is no predetermined or preexisting tax deficiency but
only a probable deficiency and current activity of the taxpayer threatens the future collectibility of that probable deficiency." Id. at 1271.
62. Id. at 1275.
63. The decision of the district court in Clark v. Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Tex.
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C.

The Irving and Williamson Cases

In 1973 the Second Circuit in Irving v. Gray64 held that the IRS
was not required to issue a section 6861 deficiency notice in conjunction with the termination of a taxpayer's taxable year pursuant to
section 6851. In another case, Williamson v. United States,5 the
Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion.
In Irving, the IRS sent termination notices to Clifford and
Edith Irving, and Richard Suskind on February 4, 1972, informing
them that taxes for the period January 1, 1971-December 31, 1971,
were immediately due and payable." At that time, plaintiffs were
under investigation by state and federal grand juries for the nowfamous Howard Hughes biography hoax." Pursuant to section
6201(a), a total of 512,111 dollars was assessed against the three. On
the same date, the IRS served notices of levy on a brokerage firm,
demanding payment of the amounts held in the taxpayers' securities accounts; the firm handed over $91,322.92 to the IRS. Alleging
that section 6861 was the authority for the assessment and that
section 6213(a) permitted an injunction when no deficiency notice
was issued as required by section 6861, plaintiffs brought suit for an
injunction to restrain the collection of the taxes.
The court cited the anti-injunction provisions of section 742168
and affirmed the lower court decision in favor of the IRS.6" Reasoning that no deficiency had been determined, the court found section
6861 inapplicable. Because the Tax Court existed for the purpose of
1972), afl'd, 501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974), the first case to follow Schreck, was followed by
Rambo v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Ky. 1972), afl'd, 492 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir.
1974), and then Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz. 1973).
64. 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973).
65. 31 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1971).
66. Irving is different from most other § 6851 cases in that the IRS terminated a taxable
year that had already ended.
Section 6851(a)(1) results in the tax becoming due and payable, not merely "owing" at
that time; the distinction is significant. For example, in the usual case of a calendar
year taxpayer, his previous year's income tax is a debt owing January 1, but is not due
and payable until April 15. An assessment would not be proper until the tax has first
become due and payable.
Meyers, supra note 7, at 833.
67. "This, as everyone knows, was a scheme by Clifford Irving and Richard Suskind to
write and sell an 'authorized' version of the life of billionaire recluse Howard Hughes, when
in fact there was no authorization therefor by Hughes." 479 F.2d at 21. Section 6851 has been
utilized against at least one other famous person, former heavyweight boxing champion
Ingemar Johansson. See United States v. Johansson, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9130 (S.D. Fla.
1961), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964), on remand, 67-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9505 (S.D. Fla. 1967), afl'd sub nom., Feature Sports, Inc. v. United States, 374
F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1967).
68. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
69. Irving v. Gray, 344 F. Supp. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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reviewing deficiency assessments, the Second Circuit concluded
that plaintiffs did not have the right to petition the Tax Court for
review. The contrary holding in Schreck was deemed erroneous for
two reasons. First, the court found that the assessment following the
termination was validly made pursuant to the general assessment
authority of section 6201, which requires no deficiency letter and
permits the IRS to make an assessment before the taxpayer makes
a deficient payment of his income taxes.7" Secondly, plaintiffs were
not without a remedy because they had the alternative of filing
regular returns after paying the assessment and then suing for a
refund in the district court six months later. 71 The court concluded
by making the following observation:
The taxpayers may, of course, eventually prevail in their claim that the IRS
has claimed more to be due than actually is due. But this is a question to be
litigated in due course after the taxpayers have filed their tax returns. As
stated by the court below in rejecting the taxpayer's request for equitable
relief, "[iut is bearable in equity that those whose 'bold plans' are frustrated
may suffer potentially costly inconveniences." 344 F. Supp. at 573. In any
event, because the taxpayers have an adequate legal remedy to recover any
excessive taxes charged by the IRS, because there was no deficiency assessment made, and because they do not come before us with clean hands we
would not be able to grant them injunctive
relief even if we believe that they
2
had been assessed too much by the IRS.1

In Williamson, the IRS relied on information concerning Williamson's arrest and indictment for conspiracy and the sale of narcotics as a basis for its seizure of the contents of his safe deposit box.
Suspecting that the money represented proceeds from the sale of
narcotics, it acted under section 6851. Williamson subsequently
filed a return and sued for a refund in the district court. He refused
to answer written interrogatories in that litigation, claiming the
fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination. The district
judge dismissed the case because of this refusal, but the Seventh
Circuit reversed on the ground that the fifth amendment privilege
73
applies to civil property forfeitures that are criminal in nature.
One of Williamson's contentions in the district court was that
the IRS failed to send him a deficiency letter pursuant to section
6861. Although not necessary to its decision, the appeals court addressed this issue as follows:
There is nothing in the Code which provides for a deficiency notice in a short
70. 479 F.2d at 24.
71. This argument has been consistently asserted by the IRS in all section 6851 cases.
See note 96 infra and accompanying text.
72. 479 F.2d at 25.
73. 31 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1971). On the fifth amendment issue see United
States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
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term jeopardy case . . . . We believe, however, that the deficiency notice
requirement cannot be read into section 6851 because the assessment made
under that section is not a deficiency as defined in section 6211. That section
defines a deficiency as the amount by which the tax imposed exceeds the
amount shown on the tax return. The assessment in this case is not an imposed
tax, but merely an amount which the I.R.S. believed justified the termination
of the taxable year. Since no return had been filed at the date of the assessment, no deficiency was determinable.74

Although Williamson has been cited as placing the Seventh Circuit
on the side of the Second Circuit in Irving, the factual context in
which the section 6851 question arose renders doubtful the precedential value of the court's statement.
D.

The Clark Case
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Clark v.
Campbell15 accepted the Rambo and Schreck analysis of section
6851 terminations and held that a section 6851 termination required
a section 6861 deficiency notice. On June 11, 1969, a search of two
buildings in Dallas by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
(BNND) resulted in the seizure of a substantial amount of personal
property belonging to the taxpayer. On July 14th the District Director of Internal Revenue notified the taxpayer that his taxable year
had been terminated. Alleging that the taxpayer owed taxes in the
amount of $104,697.20, the IRS served notices of levy on several
banks, the sheriff who conducted the search, and the regional director of the BNDD. Notices of levy were also posted on real estate
owned by the taxpayer. The IRS collected 61,000 dollars pursuant
to the levies and after the taxpayer sued for an injunction, the IRS
reassessed him and reduced the original assessment by $57,701.55.
The taxpayer first contended that the section 6851 termination
was made at the request of law enforcement officers for the purpose
of harassing and punishing him; he further challenged the facts
upon which the district director made his finding of jeopardy." Secondly, the taxpayer repeated the argument of Schreck that when a
taxable year is terminated pursuant to section 6851, section 6861 is
the assessment authority and requires the issuance of a deficiency
notice, which in turn becomes the taxpayer's "ticket" to the Tax
Court. The IRS contended that assessment authority was found in
74. 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 800.
75. 501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974).
76. Clark v. Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Tex. 1972). Plaintiff cited Rinieri
v. Scanlon, 254 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) and United States v. Bonaguro, 294 F. Supp.
750 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) for this proposition.
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section 620111 and that section 7421 was a bar to the granting of an
injunction.
The district court granted the relief sought by the plaintiff"
although taxpayer's first argument was rejected because of "the
general rule that courts will not inquire into the circumstances surrounding the Director's determination of liability."7 The court held
that the assessing authority was section 6861, which required a deficiency letter, and that an injunction under section 6213 was appropriate in the absence of such a letter. It concluded that the purpose
of jeopardy assessments is to assure that the government's interests
are protected. By giving the taxpayer a ticket to the Tax Court, the
government's interests were still adequately protected and "serious
constitutional questions" were avoided."
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment in the most exhaustive
opinion to date on the subject of section 6851 terminations. It began
with the following perceptive statement by Judge Brown:
A weapon, little known and previously not too often employed, having atomic
potentialities in the arsenal of the tax gatherer is the power of the IRS to order
quick termination of a taxpayer's tax year with summary demand for immediate payment with the sanction of levy, seizure and sale. The issue in this
appeal in a now much contested area as this technique is found to be an
effective tool in the relentless struggle against the traffic in drugs, is whether
these awesome consequences can be consummated without a deficiency notice.
If one is required, the present appellee taxpayer wins at least for the time
being. But the result far transcends immediate relief to this litigant. For a
holding against the necessity for a deficiency notice deprives the "victim" of
this summary administrative procedure of any right of prepayment judicial
review by petition to the Tax Court and remits him to payment, filing of claim
for refund, and suit in the district court for refund."'

Judge Brown first concluded that the "thing" created by a
section 6851 termination was a deficiency within the meaning of
Code section 6211,82 which contemplated the normal situation in
77. This case arose after Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969),
and is apparently the first instance in which the IRS contended that section 6201 was the
assessment authority. In Schreck the contention had been that § 6851 impliedly provided
its own assessment authority.
78. 341 F. Supp. at 176. The court held that an injunction would issue under section
6213(a) unless the IRS sent a deficiency letter. Thus the levy and assessment could remain
in effect if the deficiency letter was sent.
79. Id. at 171. Lloyd v. Patterson, 242 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1957), was cited for this
proposition. Since Lloyd was a section 6861 case, it is not clear that the court's conclusion
was mandated. See text accompanying notes 166-70 infra.
80. 341 F. Supp. at 176.
81. 501 F.2d at 110.
82. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6211(a) defines "deficiency" as:
the amount by which the tax imposed

. . .

exceeds the excess of -

(1) the sum of (A)

the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return, if a return was made by
the taxpayer and an amount was shown as the tax by the taxpayer thereon, plus (B)
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which after the taxpayer has filed a return at the end of the tax year,
the IRS determines that the tax liability exceeds the amount set
forth in the return. The regulations recognize, however, that the IRS
may determine a deficiency even in the absence of a return.8 3 When
the IRS terminates the tax year of a taxpayer, he is informed that
the tax for the terminated period is immediately due. "In short,
where the day before he literally did not then owe a tax, he is on
receipt of this demand required to pay more than he was (the day
before) obligated to do."84 Judge Brown thus reasoned that the tax
imposed pursuant to a section 6851 termination becomes a "deficiency" when not paid upon demand and that a prepayment determination of the liability is within the jurisdiction of the Tax Court.
Secondly, Judge Brown determined that the assessment authority for the tax imposed under section 6851 was section 6861.
This conclusion was again reached by careful examination of the
Code provisions. Section 6201 is the authority for assessing uncontested taxes, but when liability is disputed in the normal, nonjeopardy situation, section 6212 and the following Code provisions
come into play. Under section 6861, when a jeopardy assessment is
made, a deficiency notice similar to that of section 6212 is required,85
the chief difference being that under section 6861 the right to petition the Tax Court follows the tax assessment. As a matter of construction, Judge Brown contended that it would be "unsound" to
treat sections 6851 and 6861 differently since they both appeared in
the subchapter entitled "JEOPARDY" and were "equally potent
and similarly oriented provisions.""
Section 6851 clearly covers a jeopardy situation and the assessment subsequent to a § 6851 quick termination is as to all of its practical consequences a
jeopardy assessment. . . . To find the assessment power for a § 6851 assessment in the ordinary assessment provision (§ 6201) rather than the jeopardy
assessment provision would be a complete
derogation of the obvious and care87
fully considered pattern of the Code.
the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as a deficiency, over
-

(2) the amount of rebates.

. .

made.

83. The Treasury Regulations further amplify the definition of a deficiency:
If no return is made, or if the return. . . does not show any tax, for the purpose of the
definition 'the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return' shall be
considered as zero. Accordingly, in any such case . . . the deficiency is the amount of
the tax imposed. .

.

. (emphasis added)

Treas. Reg. § 301.6211-1 (1974).
84. 501 F.2d at 117-18.
85. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
86. 501 F.2d at 121.
87. Id. Judge Brown feared that if assessment authority for a short year termination
were found in § 6201, the IRS could effectively cut off Tax Court review for all jeopardy
taxpayers by relying on § 6851 procedures in all jeopardy situations, including those that
would previously have been handled under § 6861. Id. at 122.
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Finally, Judge Brown analyzed Congress' intent in providing
the Tax Court as a prepayment forum and found it to be a "compelling factor." The establishment of the Board of Tax Appeals in 1926
provided taxpayers with a court for judicial determination of tax
liability prior to payment and forced the contesting taxpayer to
choose between prepayment or post-payment litigation. At the same
time, the predecessor of section 6861 granted the taxpayer subjected
to a jeopardy assessment the right to petition the Board. Judge
Brown stated:
We fail to see how any legitimate government interest will be prejudiced by
construing the law to permit the § 6851 quick termination taxpayer to seek a
redetermination in the Tax Court before his assets are involuntarily applied
to the liability. The opportunity for prompt review will hardly dry up the
sources of revenue or stop the government in its tracks since virtually all other
taxpayers (§ 6861 jeopardy or otherwise) who desire to contest income tax
liability prior to payment are currently allowed to do so.',
IV.

INJUNCTIONS AND OTHER SAFEGUARDS

The termination of a taxpayer's taxable year coupled with an
assessment for taxes immediately due and payable can have catastrophic consequences for the individual and his or her family. He
or she may become indigent overnight and be left without resources
to afford even an attorney. It is clear that the IRS at times has
abused the powerful weapons at its disposal, particularly in drugrelated cases. Taxpayers have been deprived of Tax Court review
because of jurisdictional infirmities associated with the requirement
of a deficiency notice89 and precluded from district court consideration in suits for an injunction because of section 7421 .1 At this point
an examination will be undertaken of the safeguards and procedural
remedies provided by the Code and judicial interpretations thereof.
In Schreck v. United States, Judge Kaufman listed four protections afforded a section 6861 jeopardy taxpayer by the Code: (1) the
requirement of a deficiency letter that enables the taxpayer to litigate in the Tax Court; (2) the posting of a bond under section
6863(b)(3)(A), which stays collection actions by the IRS; (3) the
prohibition against sales of property during litigation in the Tax
Court; and, (4) "abatement" of a jeopardy assessment if jeopardy
is found not to exist.9 ' Additionally, a section 6861 taxpayer has
88. Id. at 126.
89. E.g., Jones v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. No. 1 (April 1, 1974); Riley v. Commissioner,
32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 847 (1973); Musso v. Commissioner, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 849 (1973).
90. See, e.g., Lewis v. Sandler, 498 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1974); Boyd v. United States, Civil
No. 73-2406 (E.D. Pa. April 16, 1974); Willits v. Richardson, 362 F. Supp. 456 (S.D. Fla.
1973).
91. 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1279 (D. Md. 1969).
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access to the district court in a suit for refund. Of these five statutory protections, a section 6851 taxpayer is afforded only two. After
discussing these two protections, the possibilities of obtaining injunctive relief will be considered.
A.

Posting a Bond

Posting a bond pursuant to section 6851(e)9" protects a taxpayer's property from forced sale during the period between the
assessment after termination and the end of the normal tax year.
The relief afforded by this section is somewhat illusory, however,
since a taxpayer who has had all of his assets summarily seized
pursuant to levy on the same day that a termination notice is given
will hardly be able to afford a bond. As one court in a section 6861
case' 3 remarked, "[t]he right to post a bond under these circumstances is meaningless and actually a mockery." Only when the
taxpayer's assets far exceed his assessment will the right to a bond
be meaningful. As the cases demonstrate, this does not occur often.
The court in Clark, for example, noted that in the cases in which
the IRS was working in conjunction with the BNDD, "[t]he IRS
assesses a tax nearly equal to or in excess of the taxpayer's available
assets."' 4 Moreover, professional sureties are not enthusiastic about
posting bonds for taxpayers who are suspected of criminal activities,
particularly narcotics violations. If a taxpayer's assets do exceed the
tax liability, he will still be unable to secure a bond because everything he owns is subject to the tax lien and the surety would have
no assets from which he could recover in the event the taxpayer
defaulted. In short, the risks to a bonding company are simply too
great to make the bond a practical safeguard."
B.

Suit for Refund

The taxpayer always has the alternative to pay the tax imposed
and sue later for a refund in the district court. The district judge in
Willits v. Richardson" stated:
92. INT. REv.

CODE OF 1954, § 6851(e).
93. Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 151 F. Supp. 901, 902 (S.D. Fla. 1957).
94. 501 F.2d at 117 n.28. In Clark itself, the assessment was $104,697.20-far in excess
of the value of the taxpayer's property that was seized. In Aguilar v. United States, 501 F.2d
127 (5th Cir. 1974), the assessment was exactly equal to the amount of cash and the value of
the truck that were seized.
95. In Yoke v. Mazzello, 202 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1953), the taxpayer in a suit involving
the bond provisions of § 273(f) of the former code (now incorporated in § 6863) was given the
additional alternative of having 2 friends act as sureties. The friends owned unencumbered
real property worth twice the amount of the assessment. Needless to say, this relief will afford
small comfort to the average section 6851 taxpayer.
96. 362 F. Supp. 456 (S.D. Fla. 1973), reu'd, 497 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1974).
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If the plaintiff reopens the taxable period by filing a [full year] tax return,
one of several possible situations will arise. First, if the full year return indicates on its face that the taxes owing for the entire year are less than the entire
amount previously collected by the Government, then the return will be
treated as an informal claim, which if not allowed or acted upon within six
months thereafter establishes jurisdiction for a refund suit in the United States
District Court. Second, if the taxpayer were to file the return for the entire year
showing less tax than that determined by the Internal Revenue Service, the
Commissioner would, if he disagrees with the return, determine a deficiency
based upon the full taxable year and issue to the taxpayer a statutory notice
of deficiency. The taxpayer, would therefore, have an opportunity for redetermination of the deficiency by the United States Tax Court. 7

The facts of Willits, however, belie the substance of the relief
afforded by the pay now-litigate later scheme. In that case the taxpayer was arrested in May 1973 and would not have been able to
file a return for the full tax year until January 1974, when she would
presumably have made a claim for a refund. 8 In the meantime, all
of her assets were subject to seizure and sale at auction unless she
posted a bond. For example, in Aguilar v. United States," the taxpayer's truck was sold within a matter of days of the seizure. And,
as Judge Brown stated in Clark v. Campbell, "[o]bviously, when
all of the taxpayer's assets have been placed beyond his control, the
00
1
six month waiting period can prove to be an unbearable delay."'
Moreover, the IRS could levy on a taxpayer's property and not
even apply the property seized to the tax liability assessed. In this
interesting situation, which actually occurred in Schreck v. United
States, the taxpayer cannot sue for a refund because he has not paid
anything prior to filing the return.'0 ' Even if the seized property is
applied to the assessment, the taxpayer is faced with the requirement that full payment of all tax liability must be made prior to
bringing a refund suit. 02 Thus, in cases in which the seized property
is inadequate to satisfy the tax liability, the taxpayer cannot bring
suit until the total liability is satisfied.
The right to judicial review of the termination assessment via
a refund suit a year or more after the seizure of one's property is
indeed a hollow remedy. Further, in the unlikely event that a taxpayer could pay the exorbitant assessments in a case similar to the
97. 362 F. Supp. at 461.
98. A refund claim is a condition precedent to bringing suit for a refund. 10 MERTENS,
§ 58.02 (1974).
99. 501 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1974).
100.

501 F.2d at 125.

101. In Schreck the property seized was not applied to the taxpayer's taxes because it
was held for a forfeiture proceeding. 301 F. Supp. at 1281.
102. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960). The Irving court believed that the
full payment rule of Flora was inapplicable to the section 6851 taxpayer since no deficiency
had yet been determined. 479 F.2d at 25 n.7.
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recent drug-related cases, a delay in filing suit of six months pending IRS action on the refund claim plus the time between the seizure
of property following termination and the end of the taxpayer's
normal tax year always will create unduly harsh delays." 3
C. Injunctive Relief and Section 7421
Most of the recent cases arising under section 6851 have
reached the courts as suits to enjoin the collection efforts of the IRS.
Until very recently, the district courts have denied relief because of
section 7421.14 The injunctive relief granted in Rambo and Clark
was based on section 6213, which provides an express exception to
section 7421's prohibition when a deficiency letter is not sent.'0 5 As
has been shown, applying the deficiency letter requirement to section 6851 terminations involves a complicated process of statutory
interpretation. The Fifth Circuit recently has granted injunctive
relief on more general equitable principles unrelated to section 6213,
deficiency letters, or assessment authority.' In view of the history
of section 7421, this practically unprecedented event is extremely
significant.
1. Background
For a century after the enactment of the predecessor of section
7421 in 1867, judicial opinion has vascillated between an absolutely
literal reading of the statute and the admission that in certain cases
an injunction might issue. The seminal case was Miller v. Standard
Nut MargarineCo.,10 1in which plaintiff, the manufacturer of a margarine substitute composed entirely of vegetable oils, had operated
for years on a three cents per pound profit margin in reliance upon
treasury rulings and court opinions that the ten cents per pound
excise tax on margarine was inapplicable. Alleging that plaintiff was
subject to the excise tax, the IRS sought to collect back taxes-a
measure that would have ruined the company. The Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiffs argument that the tax was a penalty and that
section 7421 was therefore inapplicable. The Court granted relief,
however, because of the presence of "exceptional circumstances."
Having re-examined the history and purpose of the anti-injunction
statute, the Court held that the prohibition still embodied tradi103.
104.
105.
106.
F.2d 240
107.

501 F.2d at 125 n.55.
Section 7421 is generally known as the "Anti-injunction Act." See note 20 supra.
See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
Aguilar v. United States, 501 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1974); Willits v. Richardson, 497
(5th Cir. 1974).
284 U.S. 498 (1932).
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tional equitable principles. Thus, "in cases where complainant
shows that in addition to the illegality of an exaction in the guise
of a tax there exist special and extraordinary circumstances sufficient to bring the case within some acknowledged head of equity
jurisprudence, ' suit may be maintained to enjoin the collector."'' 8
Although Standard Nut showed that injunctive relief was at
least within the realm of possibility in tax cases, the exceptional
circumstances test has not afforded much relief to taxpayers. A 1962
Supreme Court case, Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation
Co.,' ° severely limited the possibilities existing under Standard
Nut. In Williams Packing, the Court stated that "only if it is then
apparent that, under the most liberal view of the law and the facts,
the United States cannot establish its claim, may the suit for an
injunction be maintained."110 Otherwise, the "manifest purpose" of
the tax provisions-assuring the prompt collection of lawful revenue-would be jeopardized.' The traditional requirement for equitable relief-that no adequate remedy at law exists-retained its
validity. In subsequent cases, this has been interpreted to mean that
a suit for equitable relief could not be maintained when the taxpayer had the remedy of a suit for refund in the district court after
2
paying an assessment.1
In its strongest statement to date on the subject, the Supreme
Court in Bob Jones University v. Simon 3 rejected the plaintiff's
contention that an injunction was warranted under the Standard
Nut and Williams Packingexceptions to section 7421. The implication of Bob Jones is clearly that an injunction should almost never
issue. In Bob Jones, the plaintiff, a private university, was notified
by the IRS that its tax exempt status was going to be revoked
because of its segregated admissions policy." 4 Plaintiff sued for in108. Id. at 509.
109. 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
110. Id. at 7.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Lewis v. Sandler, 498 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1974); Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d
20 (2d Cir. 1973); Boyd v. United States, Civil No. 73-2406 (E.D. Pa., April 16, 1974); Willits
v. Richardson, 362 F. Supp. 456 (S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1974). In
Williams v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 71 (D. Nev. 1973), the plaintiff/taxpayer argued that
all Williams Packing required was a showing that the government acted in "bad faith." This
argument was rejected. See also Thornton v. United States, Civil No. 73-1422 (3d Cir. Feb.
20, 1974); Iannelli v. Long, 487 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1973); Sherman v. Nash, 488 F.2d 1081 (3d
Cir. 1973); Parenti v. Whinston, 347 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
113. 416 U.S. 725 (1974). The companion case to Bob Jones was Alexander v. Americans
United, Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974). The district court in Americans United had denied injunctive relief, whereas in Bob Jones relief had been granted. In both cases injunctive relief had
been denied by the Court of Appeals.
114. Tax exempt status is governed by § 501(c)(3) of the Code. As a practical matter,
however, an organization may not rely on technical compliance with section 501(c)(3) to
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junctive relief, alleging irreparable injury in the form of income tax
liability and loss of. contributions and claiming that the revocation
would violate plaintiff's rights to free exercise of religion, free association, and due process and equal protection of the law. The district court granted the relief sought," 5 but the Fourth Circuit reversed."' On certiorari, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
7
in an opinion written by Justice Powell."
The Court described the judicial history of section 7421 as a
"cyclical" development of "allegiance to the plain meaning of the
Act, followed by periods of uncertainty caused by a judicial departure from that meaning, and followed in turn by the Court's rediscovery of the Act's purpose." 181 The Court viewed StandardNut as
a departure that caused uncertainty"' and Williams Packing as
another attempt to "rehabilitate the Act following debilitating departures from its explicit language."'' 0 Its primary significance was
in switching the focus of the exceptional circumstances test from the
degree of harm to the plaintiff absent an injunction to the requirements of certainty that the plaintiff would prevail and that the
IRS's action was plainly without a legal basis. The plaintiff's first
amendment, due process, and equal protection contentions were
found sufficiently debatable "to foreclose any notion that 'under no
circumstances could the government ultimately prevail.' "1
The plaintiff contended that the IRS action did not represent
a bona fide effort to collect tax revenues, but was an attempt to
utilize the revenue laws for nonrevenue purposes-i.e., to regulate
the admissions policies of private universities. Since the case did not
truly concern taxes, plaintiff argued that section 7421 was inapplicable. The Court soundly rejected this argument, noting that
"[p]etitioner's attribution of non-tax-related motives to the Service ignores the fact that petitioner has not shown that the Service's
action is without an independent basis in the requirements of the
achieve that status. The organization must also obtain a "ruling letter" from the IRS declaring that it qualifies under § 501(c)(3). Receipt of such a ruling letter leads to inclusion on
the IRS's official roster of tax-exempt organizations. In the instant case, plaintiff was notified
that the ruling letter would be revoked.
115. Bob Jones University v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277 (D.S.C. 1971).
116. Bob Jones University v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1973).
117. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the decision. Mr. Justice Blackmun filed an
opinion concurring in the result.
118. 416 U.S. at 742.
119. "Read literally, the Court's opinion [in StandardNut] effectively repeals the Act,
since the Act was viewed as requiring nothing more than equity doctrine had demanded
before the Act's passage." Id. at 744.
120. Id. at 745.
121. Id. at 749.
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' Thus, if statutory support can be found for the procedures
Code."122
utilized, it appears to be irrelevant that the IRS acts for nontax
reasons. Moreover, the Court found that due process had not been
denied because the plaintiff had access to the Tax Court or the
district court in a refund suit. Justice Powell stated, however, that
whatsoever, the
if petitioner had had no access to judicial review
23
different.
been
have
might
conclusion
Court's
Finally, the Court recognized that harsh results could follow the
denial of an injunction and that the Code left room for abuse by the
IRS. Nevertheless, those were24 viewed as problems that were legislative, not judicial, in nature.'

2.

Recent Section 6851 Cases

In 1974 the Fifth and Sixth Circuits accepted Schreck's analysis
of jeopardy terminations and the requirement of a deficiency letter.
The Fifth Circuit additionally granted injunctive relief under the
Williams Packing standard when it found that IRS action was "arbitrary and capricious." In view of the Supreme Court's strong language in Bob Jones, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits' decisions certainly
must be viewed as exceptional. The facts of these cases, perhaps
better than any others, illustrate the possibility of abuse under the
present practice.
In Willits v. Richardson,'5 Sharon Willits, the mistress of a
suspected narcotics dealer, was arrested on May 24, 1973, for speeding and taken to police headquarters where a search of her purse
uncovered a pistol, four tablets, 4,400 dollars in cash, and some
jewelry items. She was charged with possession of narcotic drugs,
unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon, and speeding. The next
day, Mrs. Willits received a notice from the IRS that her taxable
year had been terminated for the period January 1, 1973-May 23,
1973, and that a tax of 25,549 dollars was due and payable. An
assessment for that amount was made and she was advised that
administrative or judicial action to collect the assessment would be
taken immediately. On May 29, 1973, Mrs. Willits filed suit in the
district court alleging: first, that the seizure of her property was
illegal and no jeopardy assessment had been made against her; secondly, she owed no taxes, and the assessment was based on illegally
122. Id. at 740.
123. "We do not say that these avenues of review are the best that can be devised. They
present serious problems of delay. . . . But . . . some delay may be an inevitable consequence of the fact that disputes between the Service and a party challenging the Service's
actions are not susceptible of instant resolution through litigation." Id. at 747.
124. Id. at 750.
125. 497 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1974).
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seized evidence; and lastly, she was entitled to injunctive relief
because she had been left virtually penniless by the illegal confiscation of her property and had no adequate remedy at law.'26
The IRS filed a motion to dismiss based on section 7421 and
following a hearing, the district judge granted the government's
motion.' 7 The Fifth Circuit reversed, with an opinion by Judge
Clark strongly denouncing the IRS actions:
[T]he evidence adduced (at the hearing) established such a gossamer basis
for the drastic actions of the Internal Revenue Service that they cannot be
sustained. The proof showed that the taxes assessed were based solely upon
income which was attributed to Mrs. Willits as a commission to her from the
sale of six kilos of illegally imported cocaine. . . . No basis in fact nor foundation for any reasonable assumption was demonstrated in this record that Mrs.
Willits was connected with the smuggling or sale of this or any other amount
of cocaine or narcotics.2l

The evidence further showed that Mrs. Willits had a permit to carry
the pistol and that the four tablets were a medication for which she
had a prescription. Her initial contact with the police for alleged
traffic violations was not addressed by the court directly, but the
implication clearly arises that those charges were unfounded because of circumstances surrounding the arrest. 9
Judge Clark commented specifically upon the Narcotics Project
and its methods as follows:
While the overall purposes and procedures of the IRS's Narcotics Project were
not spelled out in this record, it is transparently obvious that the action taken
as to Mrs. Willits does not represent an isolated instance wherein police information was utilized by the Internal Revenue Service to protect the public fisc.
Rather, this record clearly establishes that a seizure pursuant to the quick
termination provisions of section 6851-a procedure which according to the
contention of the IRS has the harshest possible notice and correction consequences for the purported taxpayer-was instantly clamped upon every meaningful asset of Mrs. Willits, based upon scanty and largely inaccurate information which, at best, amounted to nothing more than a vague suspicion that she
must have come by her jewelry and cash by improper means since she admitted that she gambled for a living and was kept by a man who police believed
was dealing in narcotics.30
126. Mrs. Willits was a divorcee and responsible for the raising of two children. She
received $67.50 per week alimony and $67.50 per week in child support for 5 months following
the divorce, until November, 1972. At that time she received a settlement of $400 and no
further alimony. She had no other funds or substantial property. During 1973 and part of 1972
she was supported by Rick Cravero, a suspected narcotics dealer.
127. Willits v. Richardson, 362 F. Supp. 456 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
128. 497 F.2d at 244-45.
129. Mrs. Willits and Mr. Cravero had been stopped in the same automobile by one of
the same officers 6 weeks earlier. On the night in question, the plaintiff had observed the
unmarked car following her and had pulled over twice before being arrested for speeding. This
arrest was made only after she was unable to give a specific address for her residence.
130. 497 F.2d at 245.
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Judge Clark then concluded that the power of the IRS to seize the
property of taxpayers in order to prevent the loss of tax revenues
should not be allowed to be used as "summary punishment" of
citizens suspected of criminal wrongdoing. 131
In Aguilar v. United States,13 a companion case to Clark v.
Campbell, 33 the plaintiff was a Mexican citizen and resident who
engaged in the trucking business solely in Mexico. He was not a
"taxpayer" within the meaning of the Code,'3 4 had no duty to file a
return, and had no income subject to taxation by the United States.
On July 27, 1972, while two of plaintiffs employees were in Texas
for the purpose of purchasing automobile parts for plaintiff, they
were stopped by local police for a title check. A discrepancy was
discovered and upon examination, the police discovered 11,270 dollars in the vehicle's glove compartment. 135 The truck and money
were seized and the two employees walked back to Mexico. The
police notified the Customs Bureau of the discovery and the Bureau
held the truck and money on suspicion that illicit narcotics activity
was involved. When the plaintiff sought the return of his property
and was refused, he brought suit in state court.
On August 3, 1972, the IRS terminated plaintiff's taxable year
and informed the taxpayer that a tax had been assessed and was
immediately due and payable. After notice of levy was served on the
state court holding the property, the truck was seized and sold. In
December 1972, plaintiff brought suit in federal court to enjoin the
IRS from enforcing its assessment and levy on the money seized by
the police and to recover the proceeds from the sale of the truck.
Citing section 7421, the district court dismissed the action for lack
of jurisdiction.' 36 The Fifth Circuit granted the injunction based
upon its decision in Clark v. Campbell that a deficiency notice was
required. In addition, it remanded for proceedings not inconsistent
with Willits on the issue of whether the IRS had acted arbitrarily
and capriciously under the circumstances.' 37 Noting that the issue
of the necessity of a deficiency notice following termination of a
taxable year was likely to go before the Supreme Court, the court
remanded for a factual determination of whether the IRS action fell
131. Id. at 246.
132. 501 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1974).
133. 501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974). For discussion of this case, see text accompanying
notes 75-88 supra.
134. "The term 'taxpayer' means any person subject to any internal revenue tax." INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701(a)(14).
135. The court stated that the cash was to be used for the purchase of the automobile
parts. 501 F.2d at 129.
136. 359 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
137. 501 F.2d at 130.
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within Willits and Williams Packing. Should the Supreme Court
decide against the taxpayer on the deficiency notice issue, the court
noted that the plaintiff perhaps could still obtain relief via Willits.3"
It is difficult to reconcile Bob Jones with the Willits and Aguilar
cases. Bob Jones expressly rejected the "penalty" argument that a
tax imposed for non-tax purposes was not a true tax.'3 9 Yet the
argument in Willits that the procedures were summary punishment
was accepted by Judge Clark. The Supreme Court in Bob Jones
came close to stating that an injunction should never issue, and it
has upheld no injunction since StandardNut. Although Mrs. Willits
and Mr. Aguilar undoubtedly suffered serious financial losses,
Williams Packing was interpreted in Bob Jones as making the degree of harm to the taxpayer irrelevant. Moreover, although the
"arbitrary and capricious" test applied in Willits is not mentioned
in Bob Jones, it must be assumed that Judge Clark intended "arbitrary and capricious" to be synonymous with "no legal basis." The
facts of Willits seem difficult to reconcile with this construction
because the IRS admittedly followed the statutory procedures used
in all section 6851 situations. In terminating the taxable year the
district director merely was required to believe that the taxpayer
intended to avoid payment of income taxes. Under accepted law,
this finding of jeopardy is virtually unimpeachable.'40 Although
Mrs. Willits and Mr. Aguilar have strongly sympathetic cases,
under Bob Jones it would be difficult to characterize their success
on the merits as "certain;" indeed, it would be difficult to conceive
of any case that could be so characterized. Even a finding that upon
the facts presented at the hearing for an injunction the taxpayer
would win in a later suit for refund or redetermination of liability
would not be enough to warrant the granting of an injunction. Finally, as a procedural matter, the court in Willits stated that upon
appeal of the dismissal by the district court, the appeals court
should construe "the evidence adduced in the court below most
favorably to the plaintiff."' 4 This standard of review seems clearly
inappropriate upon careful reading of Bob Jones.
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SECTION

6851

At the end of his Rambo decision, Judge Miller made the following observation:
138. Id. at 130 & n.9.
139. See text accompanying notes 122-23 supra.
140. Lloyd v. Patterson, 242 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1957) is cited for this proposition,
although it is, in fact, a section 6861 case. See also Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 242 F.2d 645,
655 (7th Cir. 1957); Shelton v. Gill, 202 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1953); Schreck v. United States,
301 F. Supp. 1265, 1279 (D. Md. 1969).
141. 497 F.2d at 244.
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Were the code to be interpreted as the IRS suggests, significant constitutional
problems would arise. A system that permits the government to seize and sell
property without affording the taxpayer any opportunity for a judicial determination of the validity of the tax prior to payment could very well raise a serious
question
of a denial to the taxpayer of his property without due process of
4
law.1 2

The cases arising under section 6851 have not addressed adequately the constitutional implications of the summary termination, levy, and sale proceedings used by the IRS. Rather, the 1931
decision of Phillips v. Commissioner' has been viewed as dispositive of the issue. In Phillips, the taxpayer challenged the collection
of a deficiency assessed under section 280(a)(1) of the 1926 Act,'
which allowed the IRS to recover the full deficiency owed by a
dissolved corporation from a shareholder who had received assets
upon dissolution. The taxpayer argued that due process was violated because the taxes would be collected before he could have the
proper amount determined by a federal district court. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed"' the Board of Tax Appeals decision that Phillips' estate was liable for the full amount of a tax
deficiency incurred by a dissolved corporation in which Phillips was
a twenty-five percent shareholder."' The Supreme Court also affirmed,'47 stating that "[t]he right of the United States to collect
its internal revenue by summary administrative proceedings. . . to
secure prompt performance of pecuniary obligations to the government have been consistently sustained .... "I" Justice Brandeis
opined that when dealing with property rights, the "mere postponement" of judicial review was not a denial of due process if the
ultimate determination of liability was adequate.'
Finally, and
most significantly, Justice Brandeis observed:
the procedure provided in § 280(a)(1) satisfies the requirements of due process
because two alternative methods of eventual judicial review are available to
the transferee. He may contest his liability by bringing an action . . .to
recover the amount paid .... Or the transferee may avail himself of the
provisions for immediate redetermination of the liability by the Board of Tax
Appeals .... 110

Phillips is distinguishable from section 6851 cases because it
dealt with a different Code provision and an entirely different fac142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1064-65 (6th Cir. 1974).
283 U.S. 589 (1931).
Section 280 was the predecessor of present § 6901.
Phillips v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1930).
Phillips v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 1218 (1929).
283 U.S. 589 (1931).
Id. at 595.
Id. at 596-97.
Id. at 597-98.

1975]

NARCOTICS OFFENDERS

tual context. First, the taxpayer had available and made use of
prepayment judicial review of the assessment in the Board of Tax
Appeals. It is not clear from the opinion whether the result would
have been different had jurisdiction not been granted to the Board
in these circumstances. Nevertheless, clearly much of Justice Brandeis' opinion, indicating that any summary collection proceeding
would satisfy due process so long as judicial review was ultimately
available, was dicta. Secondly, it is questionable in many current
cases whether the ultimate review provided by a refund suit is adequate even under the Phillips rationale. By the time a refund suit
comes to trial, perhaps over a year after termination and collection
proceedings are begun against the taxpayer (and this assumes that
he has paid the full tax),'" he could well be destitute and unable
52
even to afford attorney's fees to pursue the matter.
The most recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with due
process limitations on the deprivation of property prior to a hearing
seem relevant in evaluating the practices of the IRS in section 6851
cases. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.5 3 and Fuentes v.
Shevin, 54 the Court struck down prejudgment garnishment and replevin statutes under which notice and an opportunity for the
debtor to be heard were postponed until after property was seized.
In Fuentesthe Court expressly recognized the existence of summary
tax collection procedures, but noted that such deviations from the
general rule of notice and hearing were "truly unusual" and tightly
controlled.'55 In a 1974 case, Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,' Louisiana's prejudgment replevin statute was upheld. The Court found
that the statutory procedures afforded adequate safeguards by requiring the creditor to provide an affidavit in support of his request
for a writ of sequestration, which could only be issued upon a judge's
authority after the creditor posted a bond. Moreover, the debtor
151. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
152. The assessments in § 6851 cases are often exorbitant, making either payment or
the posting of bond impossible. In Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz. 1973),
the taxpayers were assessed $110,620, which was immediately due and payable. In Clark the
taxpayer was originally assessed almost $105,000. These assessments were based upon information that was, at best, quite questionable. For an interesting case in which the method of
reaching an assessment figure (or the lack of any method) came out in testimony see Rinieri
v. Scanlon, 254 F. Supp. 469, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ($247,820 assessment after property worth
$247,500 was seized).
153. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
154. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
155. Id. at 90-92. In dismissing a suit for injunction for lack of jurisdiction, the court in
Matthews v. United States, Civil No. 73-H-586 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 1974), determined that
Fuentes was dispositive of the issue. "Fuentes indicates that the Supreme Court intends no
retreat from its holding in Phillips."
156. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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could immediately seek dissolution of the writ unless the creditor
proved the grounds of its issuance, failing which the court could
order return of the property and assess damages, including attorney's fees, against the creditor. A later case, North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. '15 reaffirmed Fuentes and distinguished
Mitchell on the basis of the presence of these mitigating factors.
The contrast between the protections afforded a prejudgment
debtor in Louisiana and a section 6851 taxpayer is striking. The
minimum protection sought in section 6851 cases such as Rambo
and Clark is a post-seizure hearing to determine the validity and
amount of the tax liability. Assuming arguendo that a taxpayer has
no rights prior to the seizure of his property, Tax Court review after
termination and levy, with a postponement of the sale of assets
pending review, is hardly stretching due process beyond reasonable
limits. Fuentes does mention that summary seizure of property is
permissible under the tax laws, but it certainly does not imply that
property may be seized and sold in a process affording no administrative or judicial forum for a determination of the facts behind the
district director's assessment until a year or more later in a refund
suit. That is exactly what the IRS has contended in the recent cases.
It is likely that many section 6851 taxpayers would be very happy
to have even those "protections" afforded by the replevin and garnishment statutes challenged successfully in Fuentes and Sniadach.
Like the due process clause, the equal protection clause has
received scant attention in the reported decisions. In Clark v.
5 8 for example, equal protection was only briefly disCampbell,"
cussed in a foofnote. Since the court held that a deficiency letter was
required via the statutory construction route, constitutional issues
were not. reached.159 The equal protection argument is that since
both section 6851 and 6861 taxpayers are jeopardy taxpayers, affording the section 6861 taxpayer the right to prepayment review of
liability while denying it to the section 6851 taxpayer is a denial of
equal protection. 6 '
The equal protection issue has arisen in cases involving section
6871, which gives the IRS authority to assess a deficiency immediately when bankruptcy or receivership proceedings are instituted
and further denies jurisdiction to the Tax Court to litigate liability
once those proceedings begin.' Thus, no prepayment forum would
157.
158.
159.
160.
Campbell,

161.

43 U.S.L.W. 4192 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1975).
501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 126 n.57.
See Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1281 (D. Md. 1969); Clark v.
501 F.2d 108, 126 n.57 (5th Cir. 1974).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6871(b).
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be available to a taxpayer in those situations. In Jamy Corp. v.
Riddell, 12 the court held that the statute should be read to give the
taxpayer the right to have a tax claim adjudicated in the receivership court because equal protection problems would otherwise result."3 The Tax Court has adopted this approach to statutory construction of section 6871 as well, stating that "constitutional problems

. . .

would be presented in construing section 6871 to preclude

Tax Court jurisdiction in the situation where the taxpayer is effectively barred from obtaining a determination on the merits of a tax
claim in the bankruptcy proceeding."'' 4
The construction of sections 6851 and 6861 as affording Tax
Court review to a section 6851 taxpayer is not compelled by the
explicit language of the Code. Yet the equal protection problems of
denying one taxpayer what another taxpayer receives in almost
identical circumstances is obvious. The courts in Clark, Schreck,
Jamy, and the Tax Court bankruptcy cases have chosen to adopt a
construction of the Code that avoids these constitutional infirmities
by granting prepayment review although it is not expressly authorized. This approach is both sound and consistent with recognized
61 5
constitutional principles.
VI.

REVIEW OF DETERMINATION OF "JEOPARDY"

Before the district director may terminate a taxpayer's tax year
pursuant to section 6851, a condition of jeopardy must be deter-

mined to exist.'66 Although this determination has been held to be

nonreviewable in section 6861 situations,6 7 the reviewability of sec-

tion 6851 terminations is not as clear. As discussed above, the
taxpayer in Clark v. Campbell challenged in the district court the
determination of jeopardy made against him, alleging that the termination was made for improper purposes. The district court cited
Lloyd v. Patterson,'5 a section 6861 case, and refused to consider
this ground for relief. The Fifth Circuit did not consider that allega162. 337 F.2d 11 (9th Cir. 1964).
163. "We suggest that if all but bankrupts and those in receivership were permitted to
contest their taxes without prepayment, serious problems would be presented in the constitu-

tional field of equal protection. Thus we are justified in using all intendments of section 6871
to give the corporation in the receivership court a tax court type of review." Id. at 13.
164. Prather v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 445, 452 (1968). See also Orenduff v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 329 (1968).
165. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
166. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6851(a).
167. Lloyd v. Patterson, 242 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1957); Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 242 F.2d
645, 655 (7th Cir. 1957); Shelton v. Gill, 202 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1953); Schreck v. United
States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1279 (D. Md. 1969); 9 MERTENS, § 49.145 (1971).
168. 242 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1957).
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tion on appeal. Some courts have indicated, however, that the district director's discretion in terminating is reviewable to determine
whether evidence was present to support the finding of jeopardy. 6 ,
The Code itself merely states that in any collection proceedings the
district director's findings are only "presumptive evidence" of jeopardy. 70 Thus, it would seem that a taxpayer in a proper proceeding
with sufficient evidence could overcome this presumption. One
writer has speculated that since a rebuttable presumption applies
in collection proceedings, in a suit for injunction as well,
...the evidence which serves as the basis for the District Director's determination that a proper situation exists for termination of the taxpayer's taxable
year would be proper subject matter for review by the court. Therefore, if the
evidence were not sufficient to convince a reasonable man of the necessity of
termination, injunction might issue against the government. 7 '

The Supreme Court's Bob Jones decision, however, does not indicate that a reasonable man standard should be applied in injunction
suits. Additionally, the cases cited as support for the position that
court review of the district director's discretionary actions in section 6851 situations should be allowed are not persuasive. For
example, in United States v. Bonaguro, 72 the claim arose in a criminal prosecution for counterfeiting, and in Rinieri v. Scanlon,173 the
court granted summary judgment for the taxpayer in a refund suit.
Thus the facts of both these cases render their significance questionable, although both concerned taxable-year terminations that were
almost totally unsupported by the facts.174
The question whether review of the district director's discretion
is available has not yet been analyzed closely by the courts. If section 6861 analogies are relevant, his discretion will be unreviewable. 15 If Willits, Bonaguro and Rinieri retain their validity in injunction suits notwithstanding Bob Jones, the determination of jeopardy
may be reviewable when the IRS is alleged to have acted arbitrarily
and capriciously. The complicated intermeshing of various Code
provisions, ambiguous statutory language (combined with the ab169. See United States v. Bonaguro, 294 F. Supp. 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Rinieri v.
Scanlon, 254 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
170. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6851(a). See text accompanying note 15 supra.
171. Comment, supra note 8, at 388.
172. 294 F. Supp. 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
173. 254 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
174. In both cases the tax imposed was based upon the amount of cash seized by the
IRS and not upon the taxpayers' actual incomes. Thus, in Rinieri, $247,500 was found in the
taxpayer's possession and a tax of $247,800 was imposed. In Bonaguro, $1,978 was seized and
a tax of $2,021 imposed.
175. See Lloyd v. Patterson, 242 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1957); Clark v. Campbell, 341 F.
Supp. 171 (N.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974).
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sence of clarifying regulations), the Bob Jones decision, conflicting
lower court interpretations, and the variety of factual contexts in
which the issue has arisen, render this area a maze from which
drawing conclusions is difficult, if not impossible. If one assumes
that review of alleged abuses of discretion should be available, the
next question is: what is the proper forum? If a suit for injunction
is brought, Bob Jones makes the relevance of Willits, Bonaguro and
Rinieri questionable. Tax Court review is unavailable to a section
6851 taxpayer if the government's position is accepted; but assuming Rambo and Clark are correct in granting Tax Court review, what
is the extent of that review? May it go behind the validity of the
termination itself, or merely inquire into the validity of the assessment and its amount? It is understandable that courts have been
loath to tackle this matter.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This Note has not attempted to analyze in depth all of the Code
provisions that relate to section 6851 jeopardy terminations. 7"
Those provisions are a maze of ambiguities and inconsistency, and
complete harmonization seems impossible at present. The discussion has focused on recent section 6851 court decisions in an effort
to establish the framework within which section 6851 operates and
to view the problem not from a purely academic viewpoint but from
the viewpoint of federal judges attempting to make sense of a frustrating statutory scheme. As one district judge commented after
reluctantly following the Irving v. Gray line of reasoning:
Perhaps Congress, in memory of an overburdened judiciary, will someday give
us a Code more amenable to clear interpretation. Until then we will continue
to have responsible jurists reaching contrary conclusions on issues such as
those involved here, resulting in added confusion to the operation of the tax
system."'

A reading of the cases does, however, lead to a number of observations and conclusions. First, the section 6851 procedures are a
devastatingly effective means of putting a suspected drug dealer
into the poorhouse quickly. The taxpayer/suspected criminal may
be left with virtually no means of relief. Secondly, the procedures
are susceptible to abuse, and in cases such as Willits and Aguilar,
abuse has obviously occurred. Thirdly, some means of redress must
be made available that will protect the rights of taxpayers. Even
those persons who are guilty of criminal acts have the right to know
176.
177.

For a detailed analysis of the Code sections, see Meyers, supra note 7.
Preble v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
84,222, 84,225 (D. Mass. 1974).
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how their tax liability was calculated and to contest that determination prior to the sale of possibly all their assets. Fourthly, because
the Tax Court was established for the express purpose of enabling
a taxpayer to litigate liability prior to payment of the tax and because both section 6851 and section 6861 involve jeopardy situations, no legitimate reason can be discerned for allowing Tax Court
review for the section 6861 taxpayer but not for the section 6851
taxpayer. Factually, the only difference is that the condition of
jeopardy in section 6851 cases is discovered and acted upon prior to
the end of the normal tax year. Fifthly, serious constitutional issues
are raised by denying the taxpayer judicial review prior to the sale
of his or her property. The public need for revenues does not warrant
such drastic action. Lastly, equitable relief under the Enochs v.
Williams Packing Co. case appears to be virtually impossible after
Bob Jones.
These conclusions may seem simplistic, but concern over adherence to the technicalities of the Code must not cloud the human
issues presented. Rambo, Clark and Willits are judicial attempts to
bring a measure of fairness into a statutory scheme that may indiscriminately destroy a person's livelihood on the smallest shred of
suspicion of wrongdoing. Thus, it is the conclusion of this writer that
the courts are justified on both equitable principles and upon a
reasonable construction of the Code in providing Tax Court review
subsequent to section 6851 terminations. Tax Court review would
accomplish two purposes. First, it would probably eliminate unreasonable action on the part of the IRS as in Willits and Aguilar, by
affording early review of the liability imposed upon the taxpayer.
The utility of a section 6851 termination as a form of punishment
against suspected narcotics offenders lies in its swiftness and in its
almost complete freedom from external judicial control. Once
prompt judicial review is made available, the IRS almost certainly
will become more selective in its actions. Secondly, even in cases in
which the Tax Court upholds the determination of jeopardy, the
IRS would be required to justify its assessment before assets could
be sold to satisfy that liability. This minimal protection seems to
be required by Phillips and Fuentes.
The Supreme Court could legitimately affirm the construction
of section 6851 outlined in Rambo and Clark. Neither the government's nor the taxpayers' interpretation of the statutory language
is logically compelling, but the exhaustive analyses of Schreck and
Clark are certainly more persuasive than the relatively cursory examinations in Irving and Williamson. Reading Rambo and Clark in
light of Bob Jones makes this conclusion even more attractive. The
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Court recognized in Bob Jones that harsh results might ensue by
applying the literal language of section 7421 and prohibiting injunctions. Affording Tax Court review to a section 6851 taxpayer is a
legitimate means of alleviating some of the harshness of the AntiInjunction Act when the potential for abuse and harm is so great.
Ultimately Congress should act to reform the present statutory
scheme. It is suggested that the legislation should include at least
the following: first, a provision stating that the jeopardy assessment
and deficiency letter provisions of section 6861 apply to section 6851,
and that Tax Court review is available on the same terms as in
section 6861; and secondly, some method of reviewing the district
director's determination of jeopardy. It has been suggested that this
review could occur in a collection proceeding if the IRS were required to bring suit rather than use the administrative procedures
of levy and distraint as is presently done. ' The standard of review
would be minimal: the IRS must not have acted arbitrarily and
capriciously. If the court found that the district director's action was
arbitrary, the collection suit would be dismissed. An alternative
would be a statutory exception to section 7421 that would allow an
injunction if the IRS could not present sufficient evidence to justify
its determination of jeopardy.'79
The section 6851 procedures were designed to afford the IRS a
means of protecting tax revenues in situations in which immediate
and summary action is necessary. The IRS Narcotics Project created a blanket rule for the application of the procedures to suspected narcotics dealers. These persons may be more likely to evade
tax payments, but the IRS should be required to have concrete
evidence of both the fact and the extent of drug dealing. At present,
review of the district director's discretion in terminating a tax year
is probably unavailable. Under these circumstances, the only meaningful relief that a section 6851 taxpayer can possibly obtain is
prompt adjudication of the tax liability in the Tax Court. The needs
of the government for revenue legitimately owed is not jeopardized
by postponing sale of a taxpayer's assets until Tax Court adjudication is concluded, and in the final analysis, this is the only legitimate governmental interest in section 6851 situations. The punishment of criminal wrongdoers should lie in other hands.
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